CAS E DIGEST A.M. No. P-21-4102 [Formerly A.M. No. 18-04-42-MTC] Promulgated: Jan. 5, 2021

RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LABO, CAMARINES NORTE

Law: Political Law-Administrative Law

Cited Law/Order: OCA Circular No. 32-939, OCA Circular No. 113-04, OCA Circular No. 50-95, SC A.C. No. 3-0027, Commission on Audit and Department of Finance (COA-DOF) Joint Circular 1-81, 1991 Manual for Clerks of Court, 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court A.M. No. 02-5-07-SC, Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Issue: Gross Neglect of Duty, Gross dishonesty

Famous statement from this jurisprudence:

As a Clerk of Court, a vital post in the hierarchy of positions in the trial court, Rosare was expected to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity court’s good name and standing is undisputed.

FACTS:

In November 2014, the Audit Team conducted an audit of the cash and accounts of Rosare, disclosed that Rosare’s cash on hand in the amount of P154,080.00 did not correspond with the unremitted or undeposited collections on all funds in the amount of P222,484.00, resulted in a shortage of P68,404.00.

Rosare likewise failed to deposit her collections within the day or the next banking day.

Rosare was reminded to issue receipts for every STF transaction on a per case basis and reported separately.

Presiding Judge Salvador C. Villarosa, Jr. of MTC Labo was requested to assign a court personnel who can assist Rosare in handling financial transactions.

On February 16, 2017, Rosare was relieved from her position as Clerk ofCourt and her authority to receive, collect and withdraw any court fund was suspended effective immediately.

In February 2017, the Audit Team conducted another audit ofRosare’s books of accounts

An inventory of the cash on hand in the amount ofP23,625.00 and its corresponding official receipts revealed that MTC Labo has not been depositing its daily collections as per circulars issued by the Court. After the audit, the Audit Team found that Rosare had a shortage of P456,470.381.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not Rosare should be held administratively liable for the acts.

II. Whether or not Rosare’s act constitute gross dishonesty and gross neglect of duty

RULING:

I. Yes. Rosare is liable.

Rosare failed to perform with utmost diligence her responsibilities as Clerk of Court from OCA Circular No. 32-93, OCA Circular No. 113-04, OCA Circular No. 50-95, SC A.C. No. 3-0027, OCA Circular No. 32-9328, COA-DOF Joint Circular No. 1-81, SC A.C. No. 3-00, SC A.C. No. 3-2000.

Her failure to promptly remit her fiduciary collections was in flagrant violation of the said circulars.

II. Yes, it constitutes gross dishonesty and gross neglect of duty which is punishable with dismissal pursuant to the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion.

Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but a question of intention.

In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment

Rosare’s act of misappropriating court funds, as evidenced by the shortages in her accounts, by delaying or not remitting or delaying the deposit of the court collections within the prescribed period constitutes dishonesty which is definitely an act unbecoming of a court personnel.

Failure ofRosare to remit funds upon demand by an authorized without any justifiable reason constitutes prima facie evidence that she has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

As a Clerk of Court, a vital post in the hierarchy of positions in the triall court, Rosare was expected to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity court’s good name and standing is undisputed.

Final Order of the Court:

ROSARE IS GUILTY of DISHONESTY and GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, and, ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from the service with forfeiture ofall retirement benefits (excluding earned leave credits), with prejudice to her re- employment in the Government, including government-owned or government- controlled corporations.

Respondent Eden P. Rosare is further ordered to RESTITUTE the total amount ofP456,470.38

Finally, the Court DIRECTS the Office of the Court Administrator to file with dispatch the appropriate criminal charges against Eden P. Rosare.

Lesson of this case:

Any Government Employee must follow rules, especially issuances pertaining to money disposal. Non-compliance of such suffice that the employee is presumed that the funds was used for personal consumption.

Full text of the case: https://juanbatas.files.wordpress.com/2021/02/am_p-21-4102_2021.pdf

Cited Jurisprudence:

Office of the Court Administrator v. Canque

Office of the Court Administrator v. Banag

Office of the Court Administrator v. Besa

Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr.

Villar v. Angeles

Gutierrez v. Quitalig

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 198832 Promulgated: Jan. 30 2021

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPS. VIRGILIO and ANNA RAMIREZ LONTOK, RISING SUN MOTORS CORPORATION, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LOS BANOS and SANTA CRUZ, LAGUNA

Law: Civil Law

Cited Law/Order: Public Land Act

Famous statement from this jurisprudence:

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the state a cause of action. Only the allegations in the complaint may properly be considered.

FACTS:

Anna R. Lontok (A. lontok) was granted Free Patent by the DENR on 30 May 1986 and issued OCT by Registry of Deeds.

On 11 November 1991, A. Lontok sold 1,623 sq. meter portion of the subject property to the Rising Sun Motors Corporation. TCT was issued by the ROD of the Province of Laguna to Rising Sun on 25 November 1991 and numbered as TCT No. T-1 29346.

It appears on record that OCT No. P-8554 had been totally cancelled by TCT No. T-129346 and TCTs Nos. 129354-55, but no other information exists as to the specificity of the two latter titles.

On 19 January 1994, the heirs of Sps. Bartolome filed a formal protest before the DENR against the issuance of the free patent in A. Lontok’s name.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in finding that the Republic failed to establish its cause of action

II. Whether or not the State has Cause of Action in this case

III. Whether or not the subject lot is a public domain

IV. Whether or not the Director of Lands has Jurisdiction over the property.

V. Whether or not the dismissal of the subject complaint to be improper

RULING

I. No. CA did not commit a reversible error.

The Supreme Court agrees with the CA in faulting the Republic for its failure to state a cause of action in relation to its prayer for reversion.

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the state a cause of action.

Only the allegations in the complaint may properly be considered.

Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint “warrants its dismissal.”

II. No, the state has no cause action in this case.

By acknowledging the imperfect title of the heirs of Juan Bartolome, the State no longer has a cause of action for reversion because the subject realty is already of private ownership

III. No, the subject lot is not a public domain.

The subject lot already acquired a private character even before the State granted the free patent application of respondent Anna Ramirez Lontok upon looking the records.

The Republic admitted the fact of the open, continuous and adverse possession of the heirs of Juan Bartolome and their predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years.

IV. No, the Director of Lands has no Jurisdiction over the property.

The Director of Lands loses its jurisdiction over the property when the property is been acquired by a private individual by operation of law. Thus, the State has no title over the occupants and no longer possess a right to initiate an action or pray for reversion because the realty had already been acquired and no longer forms part of the public domain.

V. Yes, dismissal of the subject complaint to be improper.

To recall, the Republic initiated this complaint upon a finding of fraud in the application of a free patent. The authority to file an action in the event of fraud in the application of free patents is based on Sec. 91 of the Public Land Act

Sec. 91 expressly provides for the automatic cancellation of the applications filed on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. This Court held that it may still validly initiate a complaint for nullification of patents and titles in order to maintain the integrity of the land registration process

Final Order of the Court:

Supreme Court remanded this case to the court of origin for further proceedings on whether fraud attended the application for free patent of respondent Anna Ramirez Lontok.

Lesson of this case:

The State shall remember that it loses its cause of action, in terms of land, when the said land was acquired by a private individual, following the standards by law. But the said land can still be subject to complaints concerning the validity of the patents even if it is already given a title because Section 91 of Public Land Act so provides.

Full text of the case: https://juanbatas.files.wordpress.com/2021/02/gr_198832_2021.pdf

Cited Jurisprudence:

Yap-Go v. Spouses Uy,

Heirs of Spouses Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.

Samson v. Gabor

Aquino v. Quiazon

Sarming v. Dy

Spouses Zepeda v. China Banking Corp.

Angeles v. Republic

Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago

Tancuntian v. Gempesaw

G.R. No. L-6 Promulgated: November 14, 1901

MANUEL GARCIA GAVIERES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. T.H. PARDO DE TAVERA, defendant-appellee.

Issue: Deposit, Loan

Law: Civil Law

Legal Queries raised: The document is a deposit or a contract of loan

Cited Law/Order: Civil Code

Famous statement from this jurisprudence:

He who by laches in the exercise of his rights has caused a failure of proof has no right to complain if the court does not apply the strict rules of evidence which are applicable in ordinary cases, and admits to a certain extent the presumption to which the conduct of the interest party himself naturally gives rise.

FACTS:

Plaintiff alleges that defendant has remaining due of 1,423 pesos 75 cents from 3,000 debt.

RULING:

The document being used in this case is that a contract of loan, which it’s intention of the parties appeared. The document appears that the obligation of the depositary to pay interest at the rate of 6 per cent to the depositor which suffice that it gives an obligation and it considers as a loan.

The intention of the parties that the depositary should have the right to make use of the amount deposited, since it was stimulated that the amount could be collected after notice of two months in advance.

The contract has a character of the deposit a loan.

He who by laches in the exercise of his rights has caused a failure of proof has no right to complain.

Lesson of this case:

If a provision of an agreement says it gives an obligation to return a money with an interest rate, it is a contract of loan, even if it is considered as a deposit.

Full text of the case: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1901/nov1901/gr_l-6_1901.html 

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. L-6. Promulgated: November 29, 1945

 ANICETO ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

Issue: Jurisdiction of CA to decide a Case, crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries

Law: Criminal Law, Jurisdictional Matter

Legal Queries raised: CA power to decide the case in US Government administration even if it is made under Japanese Government

Cited Law/Order: Revised Penal Code

Famous statement from this jurisprudence:

The crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries has no political complexion.

FACTS:

Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon on the ground that CA was a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands.

RULING:

Yes. Valid, citing the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon

Supreme Court ruled that the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid except those a political complexion.

The sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code.

A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when

1. it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or

2. crime against the legitimate government like

⁃ the crimes against national security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and

⁃ crimes against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc.

They are acts penalized for public rather than private reason.

Lesson of this case:

Municipal law is not a political complexion cases. Political Complexion cases are considered as crimes against any state or government, directly or indirectly. Lower Courts can still try cases even if it is made by the previous conqueror government, as long as the cases has no political complexion.

Full text of the case: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/nov1945/gr_l-6_1945.html

Cited Jurisprudence:

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. L-5. Promulgated: September 17, 1945

 CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents

Issue: Courts’ Jurisdiction

Law: Political Law

Legal Queries raised: de facto government, principle of postliminy

Cited Law/Order: General MacArthur of October 23, 1944

Famous statement from this jurisprudence:

A legal maxim, “Law once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty.”

FACTS:

Respondent judge refused to continue the proceedings in this case because of the proclamation by General MacArthur and no law granting such jurisdiction to proceed the case as it believed that the pronouncement of Gen. MacArthur has an effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court in the country in this time were good, valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces;

2)Whether the proclamation by General Douglas MacArthur in his declaration has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and

3) If not, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth may continue the proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

RULING:

1. Yes. 

Since the philippines is considered as a de facto government, it follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments were good and valid. By virtue of principle of postliminy (postliminium), a territory occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty.

2. No. 

The proclamation by General Douglas MacArthur in his declaration has not invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts

In the International law, the belligerent occupant forbids to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights.

If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, the military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the period of occupation.

3. Yes, it may continue.

Belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant.

The laws and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of the occupied territory.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands and the laws and the courts of these Islands had become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

The present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion.

Lesson of this case:

Status quo continues to be functional. Courts are still functional even if new conqueror of the state reached, unless it is amended by any law made by the legislative body or from the people.

Full text of the case: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/sep1945/gr_l-5_1945.html

Cited Jurisprudence:

Thorington vs. Smith

U. S. vs. Rice

Porter vs. Fruedenburg

Commonwealth vs. Chapman

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. L-4 and G.R. No. L-19. Promulgated: September 4, 1945

 ANGEL CRUZ Y ENCARNACION, petitioner-appellant, vs. GUILLERMO CABRERA, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, respondent-apellee.

Crime: Qualified Theft

Law: Criminal Law

Legal Queries raised: Jurisdiction, Bench Warrant, Habeas Corpus

Cited Law/Order: Com. Act No. 361

Famous statement from this jurisprudence:

The remedy of habeas corpus cannot be legally and properly invoked when the right of appeal exists because the main purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine if petitioner is legally detained

FACTS:

Petitioner-appellant, accused, commits a crime of qualified theft of eight (8) cases of storage batteries.

RULING:

1. Yes, City of Manila has jurisdiction to try theft cases, as long as the amount involved does not exceed P200 per Administrative Code.

2. That respondent judge of the municipal court of the City of Manila has authority to issue such a bench warrant is clearly shown by the provisions of section 2469 of the Revised Administrative Code.

3. At issue in the habeas corpus case, has become a moot question by reason that petitioner-appellant is already guilty of the crime and he appeal. The remedy of habeas corpus cannot be legally and properly invoked when the right of appeal exists because the main purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine if petitioner is legally detained. Habeas corpus cannot be properly invoked to correct alleged errors committed by the trial court, which had jurisdiction of the person and the subject-matter, unless such errors made the judgment absolutely void.

Lesson of this case: 

Jurisdiction and issuance of Bench Warrant be based in the law. Writ of Habeas Corpus be availed before judgment of the court as guilty and appealed the case to the higher court. The main purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine if petitioner is legally detained.

Full text of the case: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/sep1945/gr_l-4_1945.html

Cited Jurisprudence:

People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil., 437;

People vs. Kaw Liong, 57 Phil., 839, 841, 842;

People vs. Acha, 40 Off. Gaz., 2d Supp., No. 5, p. 252;

People vs. Del Mundo,

SC-G. R. No. 46531, Oct. 18, 1939;

People vs. San Juan, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Supp., No. 10, p. 45

U. S. vs. Galanco, 11 Phil., 575

Cowper vs. Dade, 29 Phil., 222;

Abanilla vs. Villas, 56 Phil., 481;

Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil., 140, 144

Andres vs. Wolfe, 5 Phil., 60;

U. S. vs. Jayme, 24 Phil., 90.

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. L-3. Promulgated: January 29, 1946

 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE ANSOYON, defendant-appellant.

Crime: Homicide, Self-Defense

Law: Criminal Law

Cited Jurisprudence: None

Cited Law/Order: Revised Penal Code (Article 249)

Famous statement from this jurisprudence:

To avoid criminal liability of the appellant, he must prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him — self-defense — to the satisfaction of the court by relying on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.

FACTS:

Jose Ansoyon inflicted six stab wounds on Jesus Marasigan in the left side of the chest which cut the lower part of the heart.

ISSUE:

The only question to decide is whether Ansoyon did so in self-defense.

RULING:

            The Supreme Court cannot believe that:

1. the deceased could still struggle with his assailant not only to retain the possession of his own weapon but also to seize after receiving the mortal wound in the left side of the chest, which cut the lower part of the heart

2. the deceased had a revolver at that time, pulled it, aimed it at the appellant, never fired it nor made any other use of it to defend himself against the determined attack of his adversary, armed with a fan-knife and claims that he was forced to pull it from his hip pocket and open it and plunge it into the left side of the breast of the deceased after the latter had aimed his revolver.

3. Deceased would not at least use its barrel or handle to parry the blows of his adversary

4. repeatedly stabbed and killed Jesus Marasigan

It certainly would have taken the deceased much shorter time to pull the trigger of the revolver than the appellant to pull out his fan-knife from his hip pocket and open it.

The Supreme Court believe that: deceased block the successive blows of his adversary with his bare hand after he had received the stab wound in the back and before he fell and received the mortal wound in the left side of his chest

To avoid criminal liability of the appellant, he must prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him — self-defense — to the satisfaction of the court by relying on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.

Hence, he cannot escape the penalty for homicide imposed by article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

Lesson of this case:

Accused is in burden of proof in criminal cases. His evidence matters, not the evidence of any other person/party. Accused must provide strong evidence against the prosecution and the witness.

Full text of the case: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1946/jan1946/gr_l-3_1946.html